It has been stated that since The Taungthu have moved into the Southern Shan States they have been a peaceful people. Rather than come into direct conflict with the rulers of the areas, they settled on unoccupied lands at a distance from the Shan. This policy often meant bringing marginal lands and steep hill sides into cultivation, with required hard labor, they have had to work prodigiously in order to get a little more than a subsistence living. But their desire to live in peace has kept them from challenging the Shan on the more desirable lands of the valleys and plains.
There have been conflicts between communities, leading to raids and counter raids. Yet no such tradition of war or of sworn enemies has developed as was a part of the pettern of life among some of the American Indian tribes. Raids are comparatively few and usually have the purpose of settling personal grudges. The immediate purpose may be causing injury or death to an individual or looting and monetary gain. The Ko bang are prevalently involved on these forays; the older members of the community and the elders, deprecate such activities. only rarely do the headmen and the council of elders become involved on such attacks the community does not officially sanction raids against fellow tribesmen unless some very serious altercation has taken place. For example: occasionally a particular village gets a reputation for being a dau sa don, a liquor drinking village, and there is suspicion that its inhabitants are committing burglaries and armed robberies. Implicit in the derogatory term. dau sa don, is the meaning “evil men and robbers' village”. The continuous disappearance cattle from the herds of the vicinity may lead To a raid to wreak punishment on the bad village, which may mean its complete destruction by fire and the driving out of the residents to another area. This is the dire punishment of expulsion being carried out against a village community, and may have the tacit support, at least, of the more then one village. Such drastic measures are not often considered necessary; no instance of village expulsion occurred in Ashe hlet district during the five year period.
The antipathy of the Pa - O for their Shan over - lords has been mentioned before. They did not submit to the autocratic dominance of the Sawbwa and his men. The common enemy, the domineering Shan, was the object of what concerted Taungthu activities there were. There were periodic rebellions in which groups of villages would participate in refusing to pay taxes, in harrying the Sawbwa's police and retainers, and occasionally in driving the native prince and his Government from the area temporarily. In the latter instance, neighboring Sawbwas would furnish the deposed prince with a larger force; the rebellion would be quelled and the area devastated. The rebels would flee to the mountain fastness to live the life of out laws, or might move into another state to settle. The rebellions were always eventually put down by superior force and Organization; because of loyalties to local communities, it was rare that any leader could secure the obedience of a sufficient number of villages to gather an effective fighting force. Among the Taungthu, there were too many self appointed leaders for effective cooperation. During the British time, a Sawbwa could solicit help from the Burma frontier force stationed at Taunggyi, and the guerrilla tactics of the villagers were never a match for the well trained Gurkha infantry officered by the British.
During the Japanese occupation of the Shan State various types of small arms and ammunition fell into the hand of the villagers. Away before, because of strict control of arms imports by the British Government, they had been able to secure only inferior quality arms made by local gunsmiths, usually of the muzzle - loading variety. The Pa - O welcomed the allies on their return into Burma, harboring the parachutists of the O.S.S force 101, but they did not use their arms against the Japanese. Carbines, garands, stens, brens, shot guns, automatic rifles and united machine guns and revolvers were used for hunting and village defense, but rarely in what could be termed aggressive warfare. Some Pa - O Nationalistic feeling was engendered, but no leadership emerged to consolidate it into action for the overthrow of the Sawbwa. This was the situation in Ashe hlet during the year 1948 and until the Karen invasion in August 1949.
The Karen were well aware of the antagonism of the Taungthu toward the Sawbwas and capitalized on it. The Taungthu were promised that if they joined with the Karen, first, the Sawbwas would be deposed and, second, the Pa - O would be allowed to from an autonomous state in southwestern, Shan State. The leaders of the Pa - O National movement, who had been ineffectual up to this time, were given positions in the insurgent army and recruited many young men for the Karen. In this way Taungthu soldiers received their training and first experience in modern warfare, and their officers some instruction in military tactics. When the Karen were driven back to south, some of the Taungthu went with them, but most of them merely hid their guns and remained in their villages. The Karen left behind some military advisors who have been influential in keeping a live the military aspect of the Pa - O national movement. Vest areas of the southern Shan State have been under the control of these guerrillas and in some areas there has been open warfare between Government forces and the Taungthu insurgents. This situation obtains today.
The Ashe Hlet district is one of the areas which is largely under the control of the insurgent. A considerable number of the Ko Bang of this areas have been recruited for the guerrilla forces which have been harassing the Government forces. Although the whole Taungthu insurgent movement has been sub rosa, some general information concerning the military Organization on is commonly known.
The top commander of the insurgent forces is a Taungthu with considerable experience in the Burma frontier force both before and after the Japanese occupation. His title is Bo - gyi (leader), a Burma military title given to group leaders of the higher echelons. He is incharge of the general strategy of the entire insurgent fighting force and makes the major decision of disposition of troops. He is the self - appointed leader who has established himself by virtue his experience and his personal success as an able military commander.
Among his lieutenants it is rumored that he have some Karen with British Army training and war experience, who are advisors as to general strategy. Other lieutenants are self style local leaders who have been able to recruit and arm bands of youths. The whole system appears to be built upon the personal leadership of local men, and the loyalty of the men is to their Bo. This has made the Organization of an integrated fighting force a task of diplomacy combined with rather ruthless treatment of local leaders guilty of insubordination. Only the heroic attributes of the Bo - gyi and his dauntless courage, together with some oft-repeated fictitious stories concerning his out witting of the enemy, have held the dissident elements together and fighting for the overthrow of the Sawbwas.
The rank and file of the insurgent forces are drawn from the Ko Bang and from the new ex - army personal now resident in the villages. Local leaders recruit the men, attempt to secure arms for them, and report with this non - descript unit to the Bo gyi's headquarters. Most of the members of the unit are between fifteen and twenty years old, with no former military training or service. Often the civilian leaders of the communities are called to the headquarters and told that they must supply young men for service, but no way of enforcing this demand has been found. If the young men have responsibilities for the support of families, they do not go to the front, for there is no pay and looting for personal gain is disparaged, though it some times occurs.
It is the prerogative of the soldier that he be fed at the villages through which he passes on his way to the front. The Bo gyi attempts to provide paddy to certain villages which thus become commissariats; when a group of soldiers comes to one of these villages the women and girls mustercook the meals for them. The headmen of the village concerned must conserve the supply, and often the village has to provide food when the supply runs out. The soldiers must usually bring their meat with them; otherwise Avery ordinary curry of garden vegetables is provided.
At the present time it is almost impossible to differ - entiate between the political power and the military power wielded in this area. Within the Taungthu tribe there has never been a civil leader above the rank of htamon; there fore, the Bo gyi has assumed the powers formerly wielded by the myosah in Ashe hlet, and this power is felt through out the insurgent areas. Through his lieutenants he sends orders to the headmen of communities and, though some of them are known to resent the arrogance of the young military men, They must cooperate. There are agents of the Pa -O National Organization in many of the village communities, trying to collect the taxis and urge the people to support the movement for autonomy, but they most bow to the treat of arms by the military lieutenants, who often demeaned support without regard to the burden upon the people and the inequity of their demands. Lack of a hierarchical Organization in the army or any clear discontent among the people. Any Bo who come to the village asserts his authority, backed by the arms of his followers, and the civil authorities must do his bidding. In this situation, the discontent of the civil leaders is hardly surprising.
No systematic method of granting furloughs and leaves of absences has been worked out. Any soldier may leave the line or his post by securing the permission of his immediate superior; often he does not even get permission, gut merely sends word by another man that he has a reason for returning to his village. Because of this lack of discipline, the commander of a number of unit never knows just what the strength of his units is, or whether they are numerically strong enough to mount an attack or defend a position. One informant stated that many of the servicemen served about three weeks in the line and returned to the villages for ten days' furlough. And at that very time, the rebels were fighting a full scale battle against the Sawbwas' forces.
Discipline is sadly lacking in the military Organization. Courage and obedience are not considered virtues in the sense that they are in the military establishment of western countries. When the engagement appears to be going against them, the tendency is for herd - pressed units to withdraw, with the result that the enemy break through. Their sole military experience is that of guerrilla war fore, Taking the enemy by surprise, striking swiftly for a quick advantage, and withdrawing if that advantage is not gened. Such tactics are effective when operations are carried on by independent units not in close proximity to each other. When a large scale engagement is planned, unless each unit holds its section of line, an organized force can get behind other units and cut them up. A number of battles have ended in this fashion, with rather demoralizing effect. In such circumstances, the officer in command of units has little of no control, and the withdrawal assumes the aspects of a rout. In defeat, the morale of the engaging troops is destroyed; only the personal courage of the leaders can restore it. In all its aspects, the morel if these insurgent troops depends upon the courage and resource fullness of the leaders: no other techniques are used. When morale is low, the insurgents withdraw from military action and return to their jungle restreats, and the Government forces have a respite. Under these conditions, it is difficult to see how a decisive victory can be achieved by the rebel forces.
The difficulty of the terrain and the fact that the Government, through a system of road - blocks, is able to control most of the main highways limit the types of transport that can be used. The army is made up of foot - soldiers; a large number of the leaders have horses and all couriers travel by horse, except where it is dangerous for them to do so. The only motorized transport is a jeep owned by the Bo gyi, which he cannot use because of the danger of capture on the roads; he usually travels by horseback. The Taungthu are mountain people, trained from childhood to travel miles on foot, they are capable of making a fifty miles forced march within a fifteen - hours time limit. In much of the area the terrain limits movement to travel on foot, and the insurgents are able to take advantage of this fact in their engagements and withdrawals in combat with the Government forces.
The supply services of the rebel forces are largely unorganized. Occasionally food may be stockpiled in certain villages but many of the armed personal live off the country. Arms and ammunition must be secured mostly by capture from Government forces. There have been rumors that some small arms and ammunition have been procured though Siam. These rebels; whether or not the Taungthu have secured supplies through Siam is not known. The perennial shortage of arms and ammunition which has limited insurgent action would perhaps indicate that this avenue is not open.
Military technology is at a very low level of development. Shallow trenches and earthen embankments are set up around an encampment, but are hastily format and quickly abandoned in the constant movement which is characteristic of guerrilla warfare. A strongly defensible position may be converted into a redoubt by the use of logs and earthworks. Large trees may be felled across a road to from a roadblock. All this work is accomplished with the simplest hand tools similar to those used in the villages. The huts and lean - tos witch house the armed forces are of highly temporary construction, being made of brush and thatch grass, built in very small units to house three to five men, and carefully camouflaged in clumps of bamboo and bushes. These huts are thrown up in a few minutes using the available materials, small trees, bamboo, leaves and thatch. Military personal often depend upon the local villages for shelter.
When a young man is recruited he usually procures for himself a long dah, which serves as a sword. The handle of this weapon is about twelve inches long; the blade veries in length from twenty to thirty inches, and is inserted in a wooden sheath. The sheath is suspended from the left shoulder by a heavy cord, the weapon being in a vertical position with the handle under the left arm. The recruit ordinarily brings with him the dagger which he has carried in civilian life.
What ordinance he receives beyond what he brings with him is dependent upon the recent success or failure in the capture of arms from the Government forces. The types of small arms supplied to insurgent soldiers known, because during a period when the Government declared an amnesty if rebels would surrender their arms, hundreds of arms of all types were surrendered. Any gun for which ammunition can be secured. It is impossible to compile a complete list, but the following will be indicative of the types of arms used: locally made brass tube muzzleloaders; shot - guns, 8, 10, 12, and 16 bore; Japanese rifles and machine guns, German masseurs; American carbines, M-1's; Garands, automatic rifles, and light and heavy machine guns; British service rifles, Stens, and brens; and even 22 calibre sporting guns. Ammunition which veries slightly in calibre is often altered to fit more than one type of gun. Shells of certain types are retained and repacked by hand with gunpowder purchased from the Shan and Chinese. Such make - shift ammunition is not effective except at close range, but as in jungle fighting much of the action is at close range, it is useful.
Two and three inch mortars are often captured from the Government forces but the problem of securing ammunition for them is more difficult. Attempts have been made to manufacture mortar shells, according to reports, but have been largely unsuccessful. The rebel army has captured a few small field pieces but have abandoned them because of their weight and the lack of ammunition. Hand grenades are used when they can be secured from the enemy.
There is no uniform worn by the insurgent Taungthu forces. A very few of them wearparts of the uniforms of captured Burma army personal. One of the problems of detection by Government forces has been the absence of uniforms, since the rebel soldiers often hide their arms outside and enter Government area towns without being detected.
All the information given in this chapter deals with the military aspects of the fight for local autonomy by the Pa - O people. Although the Pa - O National Organization has its main office in the town of Taunggyi and is negotiating with Government to get more authority for local civil leaders, some of those who would identify themselves with the Organization are participating in insurgent actions to wrest authority from the Sawbwas. One cannot say that the two groups are working together, but it is reasonably certain that their ultimate objective is the same, viz, local autonomy and perhaps a Taungthu state. The military organization described above has been formed in order to attain this purpose by force; no such military structure was known among the Taungthu until after the Karen invasion of the Shan State in 1949. It is impossible to estimate accurately the size of this military organization. Government estimates have given a figure of five thousand armed men; the local Taungthu claim ten thousand. As in all volunteer guerrilla organization, the numbers fluctuate from one month to another. It is still in its firmative stages and may be modified by future events.
CONCLUSIONS
